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In a recent paper, Barrett (2006) reaches the conclusion that in general the answer to the question in
the title is no. We show in this paper that a focus on the R&D phase in the development of breakthrough
technologies changes the picture. The stability of international treaties improves and thus the possibility








In a recent paper, Barrett (2006) investigates whether an international envi-
ronmental agreement, such as a climate treaty, can perform better if it relies
directly on targeted R&D and the adoption of breakthrough technologies.
This is important because the literature shows that treaties that just rely
on abatement, such as the Kyoto Protocol, cannot be expected to achieve
much (Barrett, 2003, Finus, 2003). Furthermore, the international debate
circles to some extent around the question whether international treaties
should focus on technology development rather than on emission reduction.
Barrett (2006) reaches the conclusion that in general the answer to the ques-
tion whether such a treaty can perform better is no, with the exception of
breakthrough technologies that exhibit increasing returns to scale. In this
paper we will show that the picture is not necessarily so grim. By intro-
ducing the option that the adoption costs of a breakthough technology vary
with the level of R&D, we will show that a large stable coalition can result
that leads to a substantial improvement in average welfare. The basic idea
is that a coalition can improve on a non-cooperative equilibrium in which
the countries invest su¢ ciently much in the public good R&D to trigger a
breakthrough technology. Either a coalition forms that invests even more
in R&D (accepting that the other countries free-ride on this investment) be-
cause it pays to further lower the costs of adoption. Or a coalition forms that
invests less in R&D but is large enough to realize a substantial improvement
in average welfare by itself. In the last case the non-cooperative equilibrium
would lead to an overinvestment in R&D.
The literature on international environmental agreements has investigated
various approaches for enlarging the size of the stable coalition. If coalition
members can secure extra positive externalities between them, for example by
linking the agreement to an R&D agreement with larger spillovers between
coalition members, the size of the stable coalition will grow (Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1997). In general, if the issue of negotiation can be linked to a
2second issue, the bargaining space may get larger with more opportunities
to reach an agreement (Cesar and de Zeeuw, 1997). Another approach is
extending the stability concept. For example, the concept of farsightedness
takes into account that countries consider further defections as a consequence
of their own defection and this stabilizes larger coalitions (Diamantoudi and
Sartzetakis, 2002). A similar e⁄ect is achieved by adding a ￿rst stage to
the game in which countries decide on a minimum participation constraint,
because this also prevents one-by-one defections down to the standard small-
size stable coalition (Carraro, Marchiori and Ore¢ ce, 2009). Finally, learning
in case of uncertainty can enlarge the size of the stable coalition as well
(Kolstad, 2007). This paper takes another angle by focusing on R&D and
the adoption of breakthrough technologies. Cooperation may not be needed
to achieve su¢ cient R&D and a switch to the new technology but cooperation
may be needed to prevent under- or overinvestment in R&D.
2 Adoption costs, R&D and the social opti-
mum
Barrett (2006) assumes a ￿xed cost of adoption, c, which requires a certain
level of R&D, M. In the R&D phase countries decide how much they want
to contribute to this public good. In this approach the R&D phase precedes
coalition formation and the adoption of new technology. If the expected
average net bene￿ts are su¢ ciently high, an equilibrium exists that yields the
required R&D level M. The reason here is simply that each country does not
want to contribute less, because then the bene￿ts are not realized, but does
not want to contribute more either, because then the costs become higher
without higher bene￿ts. This is an example of voluntary provision of a public
good (see e.g. also Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989). We change the set-up and
link the cost of adoption c to the level of R&D M by a function c = c(M) with
c0 < 0, c00 > 0. We assume that for values of M giving c(M) ￿ 1, c(M) + M
3is increasing in M, i.e. ￿c0 < 1. This last assumption is reasonable: If
the opposite were true, one dollar of investment in this type of R&D would
reduce the adoption costs for this technology by more than one dollar for
all countries. Compared to Barrett (2006), we change the order of decisions
too: countries ￿rst decide whether they want to join the coalition or not
before they decide on investment in R&D and adoption. In this way we also
get the balance between R&D and adoption costs. Barrett (2006) connects
the option of adopting breakthrough technologies to a standard international
abatement game but we abstract from that because the qualitative results do
not change and the analysis becomes more transparent. As in Barrett (2006)
we assume that R&D is a public good but the same results can be derived
in a setting with imperfect R&D spillovers. The countries are the same but
it would of course be interesting to extend the analysis to a heterogeneous
set of countries but this is left for further research. Finally, our model is
deterministic but it would of course also be interesting to extend the analysis
to uncertainty and learning by doing.
We normalise the bene￿ts for a single country of adopting the new tech-
nology to 1. This is equal to the damage (for the single country) caused
by the pollution that will be generated continuing with the old technology
(for example the damage caused by further emitting large amounts of CO2).
These bene￿ts can be realized by the country itself but can also be free-rider
bene￿ts from adoption of the new technology in another country. Once the
technology is developed, it is individually rational for each country to adopt
if and only if c ￿ 1. The problem is that usually we have that c(M)+M > 1
for all M, so that it is not optimal for an individual country to develop and
adopt the new technology just by itself. In the setting with a constant c that
Barrett (2006) uses, c > 1 simply means that without coalition formation the
new technology will not be adopted: a group of countries is needed to gener-
ate su¢ cient bene￿ts to cover the costs of adoption. Note that this is similar
to the standard linear international abatement game (e.g. Kolstad, 2007).
4In our setting, however, it is in principle possible that the countries together
invest so much in R&D that it becomes individually rational to adopt the
new technology, because c depends on M. We denote that level by ￿ M, which
means that c( ￿ M) = 1.
If the countries operate together, they minimize Nc(M) + M and if the
resulting costs are su¢ ciently low to make it collectively rational to adopt
the new technology, each country will have a net bene￿t equal to








We will assume that V (N) is positive so that the social optimum leads to
full adoption.
3 Non-cooperative equilibria
Without any cooperation, the outcome is given as a subgame perfect equilib-
rium of a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage each country chooses its level of
R&D investments. The properties (i.e. the costs) of the new technology are
determined by the sum of R&D investments as explained in section 2. In the
second stage each country chooses whether to adopt the new technology. It
is clear from our assumptions that one subgame perfect equilibrium of this
game is for all countries to have no R&D investment, and thus no adoption
of any new technology. However, there may exist a second subgame perfect
symmetric equilibrium. This will be the case if ￿ M exists and ￿ M ￿ N(N ￿1).
In this case an equilibrium exists in which each of the N countries invests
￿ M=N in R&D, and all countries adopt the new technology. Each country
will in this case have a net bene￿t equal to




5which is non-negative for ￿ M ￿ N(N ￿ 1). It will not be bene￿cial for a
country to deviate unilaterally since the total level of R&D will end up below
￿ M, so that none of the countries will adopt the new technology anymore.
Moreover, since we have assumed that c(M) + M is increasing in M it does
not pay for an individual country to increase investments above ￿ M. We can
thus conclude that when ￿ M ￿ N(N ￿ 1); a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
R&D investments with full adoption exists. Notice that this game also has
asymmetric equilibria but we assume that these will not occur. Furthermore,
notice that even though we have full adoption of the new technology in this
equilibrium, the outcome di⁄ers from the ￿rst-best social optimum. In the
latter, the choice of R&D was determined so that the sum of investment
and adoption costs for each country were minimized. In the non-cooperative
outcome, the level of R&D is exactly as large as it must be for all countries
to want to adopt the new technology. This level will generally di⁄er from
the ￿rst-best R&D level, and generally we do not know whether it is lower
or higher than the ￿rst-best level.
Since even the "good" non-cooperative equilibrium (if it exists) is inferior
to the social optimum, we want to investigate if a stable coalition can improve
upon the outcome compared to the non-cooperative equilibria. We therefore
now turn to coalition formation and show that substantial improvement is
possible in our setting.
4 Coalition formation
We use the model for coalition formation that was introduced into the litera-
ture on international environmental agreements by Hoel (1992), Carraro and
Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994) and that is based on a model for cartel
stability developed by d￿ Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz and Weymark
(1983). The idea is that countries ￿rst decide whether they want to join the
coalition or not before they take action. In the equilibrium of this two-stage
6game a member of the coalition does not have an incentive to quit (inter-
nal stability) and an outsider does not have an incentive to join (external
stability).
This literature usually provides a rather grim picture: Stable coalitions
are large if there is not much to gain from cooperation and are otherwise
typically very small (Barrett, 1994). This result was challenged from di⁄er-
ent angles. Chander and Tulkens (1995), for example, use the gamma-core
concept from cooperative game theory to show that the grand coalition is
stable in the sense of being an element of the core. The basic idea is very
similar to the idea of trigger strategies in repeated games where the threat
of loosing cooperative bene￿ts prevents countries to cheat. The essential
di⁄erence with the standard literature on international environmental agree-
ments is the assumption on the behaviour of the other coalition members in
case a country defects. In the stability concept above the remaining coali-
tion stays intact, whereas in the gamma-core concept the original coalition
falls apart in case a country (or a group of countries) defects. Diamantoudi
and Sartzetakis (2002) apply the idea of farsightedness to show that a set of
stable coalitions exists, among which large ones. The basic idea is that if a
country defects, other coalition members defect as well but only up to the
point where the remaining coalition is stable again. This threat proves to
be su¢ cient to sustain large coalitions, although in a dynamic context where
detection of deviations takes time, the idea may not work (de Zeeuw, 2008).
In this paper we base ourselves on the concept of internal and external
stability, because the underlying assumption seems reasonable for the current
practice of international environmental agreements. We will show, however,
that if we replace the second stage of this game by the two-stage game of
investment and adoption, decribed in the previous section, a large stable
coalition may arise. We distinguish two cases.
7Case 1: ￿ M > N(N ￿ 1)
It is immediately clear that if the non-cooperative equilibrium with full adop-
tion (M = ￿ M) does not exist, outsiders will not invest in R&D. In that case
~ V is negative, so that outsiders do not have an incentive to invest in R&D if
the coalition does not invest more than k ￿ M=N in total. The coalition could
consider to invest more in R&D in order to induce the outsiders to invest
as well but then the coalition￿ s net bene￿t becomes negative. This implies
that the coalition is on its own and adopts the new technology if and only if
c(M) ￿ k. Individual outsiders will not adopt since total R&D expenditures
M will be smaller than ￿ M. Formally, we have the following three-stage game:
stage 1: each country chooses whether or not to join the coalition
stage 2: the coalition chooses R&D expenditures
stage 3: the coalition chooses whether or not to adopt the new technology.
Note that there is no new stage of coalition formation between stages 2
and 3: Once a coalition is formed in stage 1, it remains a coalition after the
investment decision has been made in stage 2. Suppose that a coalition of
size k forms, 0 < k < N. Similar to the full-cooperative case in the previous
section, the coalition minimizes kc(M) + M and if the resulting costs are
su¢ ciently low to make it collectively rational to adopt the new technology,
each member of the coalition will have a net bene￿t equal to








The solution to the minimization in (3) is denoted by M￿(k) and since c00 > 0,
it is clear that M￿ is increasing in k. Note that the decision to join the coali-
tion or not must indeed be binding after the second stage. Otherwise, if
countries could choose again after the R&D investments are made, an indi-
vidual country would prefer to be outside the coalition of size k ￿1, because
the adoption costs are larger than 1 in the case we are now considering.
Since ￿(k) is increasing in k (using the envelope theorem) and since we
8have assumed that ￿(1) is negative and ￿(N) = V (N) is positive, ￿(k) must
be 0 for some k0 between 1 and N. Consider the coalition of size K0, de￿ned
as the smallest integer at least as high as k0. The net bene￿t to each member
of this coalition is ￿(K0), which is non-negative but small. This coalition is
internally stable: if one country instead of joining the coalition chooses to be
an outsider, the coalition of size K0 ￿1 will not develop the new technology,
so that it is better to stay in the coalition. Consider now the coalition of size
K satisfying k0 + 1 ￿ K ￿ N: The net bene￿t to each member of such a
coalition is ￿(K), which is smaller than K￿1 since c(M￿(K)) > 1. Therefore
this coalition is not internally stable: if one country instead of joining the
coalition chooses to be an outsider, the coalition of size K ￿ 1 will develop
and adopt the new technology, so that the country will get a bene￿t of K ￿1
without costs. As a consequence, the coalition of size K0 is also externally
stable and thus the only stable coalition.
Note that the stable coalition achieves very little. This is in line with
the pessimistic result that Barrett (2006) derives. In this case our model is
only slightly di⁄erent. We allocate total R&D costs to the coalition whereas
Barrett (2006) assumes that R&D is ￿nanced by all the countries not knowing
whether they will be in or out of the coalition. Otherwise, the models are
essentially the same in this case. However, in our setting a non-cooperative
equilibrium with full adoption (M = ￿ M) may exist and then the picture
changes.
Case 2: ￿ M ￿ N(N ￿ 1)
If the non-cooperative equilibrium with full adoption (M = ￿ M) exists, then
the coalition has a choice to dissolve again and rely on this equilibrium, with
a non-negative net bene￿t ~ V for its members, or to act as a coalition. If the
coalition acts as a coalition, then either the coalition plays the investment
game in the R&D phase with the outsiders or the coalition is on its own in
that phase. Although this investment game has equilibria in which a coalition
9member invests less than an outsider or more than an outsider, we assume
that these will not occur, just as we were not considering asymmetric non-
cooperative equilibria in the previous section. This implies that the coalition
either relies on the non-cooperative equilibrium with full adoption (M = ￿ M)
or improves on that by acting as a coalition and doing all the investment on
its own. Formally, we have the following four-stage game now:
stage 1: each country chooses whether or not to join the potential coalition
stage 2: the potential coalition decides whether or not to act as a coalition
stage 3: either each individual country or the coalition chooses R&D
expenditures
stage 4: either individual countries or coalition and outsiders choose
whether or not to adopt the new technology.
First we focus on stages 3 and 4 of the game in case the coalition stays
intact and chooses R&D expenditures. The situation is more complicated
than above because the coalition of size k may choose M to be equal to
or larger than ￿ M. Three possibilities occur. Either the optimal investment
in R&D is su¢ ciently high so that all countries adopt the new technology,
which means that each member of the coalition will have a net bene￿t equal
to








or the coalition invests ￿ M at its own cost in order to induce the outsiders
to adopt the new technology as well, which means that each member of the
coalition will have a net bene￿t equal to







or it does not pay for the coalition to invest so much, which puts us back
in the situation above with ￿(k) as the net bene￿t. The value function of a
member of the coalition of size k in this case is simply the maximum of the
10three possibilities ￿(k), ￿ ￿(k) and ￿(k) and is denoted by V (k). Two typical
outcomes are depicted in Figures 1 and 3 with the corresponding levels of
R&D in Figures 2 and 4, respectively. In Figures 1 and 2 M￿(N) is larger
than or equal to ￿ M, so that all three possibilities can occur, and in Figures
3 and 4 M￿(N) is smaller that ￿ M, so that only the last two possibilities can
occur.
[Insert Figures 1 - 4 here]
It is easy to see that ~ V > ￿ ￿(k) for all k < N, with ~ V given by (2). In other
words, the net bene￿t of a country in the non-cooperative equilibrium with
M = ￿ M exceeds the net bene￿t of a member of a coalition investing ￿ M in
R&D. This is illustrated in Figures 1 and 3. The intersection point between
V (k) and ~ V is denoted by ~ k. It follows that for k < ~ k the coalition cannot do
better on its own, compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium. Therefore,
a coalition of this size decides in stage 2 of the game not to act as a coalition,
so that the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium with M = ￿ M and with
net bene￿ts equal to ~ V results. For k > ~ k, however, the coalition will invest
M￿(k) in R&D on its own and adopt the new technology, giving its members
a net bene￿t V (k) > ~ V . If M￿(k) > ￿ M, as in Figure 1, outsiders will adopt
the new technology as well and each of them achieves a net bene￿t equal to
N ￿ c(M￿(k)). If M￿(k) < ￿ M, as in Figure 3, outsiders will not adopt the
new technology and each of them receives a bene￿t equal to k. Outsiders
are always better o⁄than coalition members, so that both coalition members
and outsiders are better o⁄than in the non-cooperative equilibrium with full
adoption.
De￿ne ~ K as the lowest integer satisfying ~ K ￿ ~ k. A coalition of size
~ K ￿ 1 will not form in stage 2 of the game. It is in the interest of those
countries to stay apart and to end up in the non-cooperative equilibrium
because ~ V > V ( ~ K ￿ 1). This implies that a coalition of size ~ K is internally
stable, because leaving this coalition will give a net bene￿t ~ V which is smaller
than V ( ~ K). Under reasonable conditions, a coalition of size K ￿ ~ k + 1 is
11not internally stable. For the situation of Figures 3 and 4, it is easy to see
that a coalition of size K ￿ ~ k + 1 is never internally stable: An outsider to
the coalition of size K ￿1 is better o⁄than a member of the coalition of size
K since the costs of adoption are higher than 1 (which is the bene￿t of one
more country adopting the technology) and the outsider is not investing in
R&D. It follows that in this situation the coalition of size ~ K is also externally
stable and therefore the largest stable coalition.
In the situation of Figures 1 and 2, it is not quite so obvious that an
outsider to the coalition of size K ￿ 1 is better o⁄ than a member of the
coalition of size K, if K ￿ ~ k + 1. In this case full adoption occurs both for
the coalition of size K ￿ 1 and K, and therefore the di⁄erence in payo⁄s
is only in costs. The cost of an outsider to the coalition of size K ￿ 1 is
simply c(M￿(K ￿ 1)), while the cost of a member of the coalition of size K
is c(M￿(K)) +
M￿(K)
K . A coalition of size K ￿ ~ k + 1 is therefore internally
stable if and only if
c(M











For this inequality to hold, adoption costs must decline quite signi￿cantly if
the coalition is enlarged by one member. From the de￿nition of M￿, given
by (3), it is clear that
c(M







implying that the l.h.s. of (6) cannot exceed 1
K￿1 [M￿(K) ￿ M￿(K ￿ 1)]. A
necessary condition for (6) to hold is therefore that





12If for instance K = 10, the decline in R&D investment when the coalition
size drops from 10 to 9 must be at least 90%. Although such cases cannot
theoretically be ruled out, we ￿nd them quite implausible. It follows that
in this situation, under reasonable conditions, a coalition of size K ￿ ~ k + 1
is not internally stable, and therefore the coalition of size ~ K is the largest
stable coalition.
The coalition ~ K gives its members only a slightly higher net bene￿t than
they would have achieved in the non-cooperative equilibrium. However, the
outsiders get a much higher net bene￿t in this case, so that the average net
bene￿t may be substantially higher than in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The uneven distribution of bene￿ts is typical for these models and requires
further attention (just as the uneven distribution in the theoretical equilib-
rium for the Ultimatum game). In this paper, however, we focus on what
coalition formation can achieve in terms of average welfare. Before we discuss
the results, we will ￿rst give a numerical illustration.
5 A numerical illustration
















13Suppose that the number of countries N = 201 and that ￿ = 225. It follows
that the ￿rst-best R&D investment level is 67, giving each country a net ben-
e￿t equal to 13:29. Furthermore, ￿ M = ￿ = 225, so that a non-cooperative
equilibrium with positive R&D exists, giving each country a net bene￿t equal
to 7:75. In this case the non-cooperative equilibrium leads to an overinvest-
ment in R&D, implying that this net bene￿t is considerably lower than the
one in the social optimum.
Since M￿(N) < ￿ M, Figures 3 and 4 apply. It is easily veri￿ed that in
this example the value function V (k) does not have the kinks, as depicted
in Figure 3, but yields the simpler Figures 5 and 6. The smallest coalition
giving its members a non-negative net bene￿t is K0 = 10. For this coalition
size, coalition members get a net bene￿t equal to 0:51 while outsiders get
10. The average net bene￿t is 5:26, which is considerably lower than the
net bene￿t in the social optimum and also lower than the net bene￿t in the
non-cooperative equilibrium. The largest stable coalition size in our setting,
however, is ~ K = 16, giving coalition members a net bene￿t equal to 8:5. The
4 outsiders get a net bene￿t equal to 16, so that the average net bene￿t is 10.
Although this is smaller than the average net bene￿t in the social optimum,
it is considerably larger than for the coalition of size K0, and also larger than
the average net bene￿t in the non-cooperative equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
International environmental agreements are usually viewed upon as insti-
tutions with the purpose to overcome negative transboundary externalities.
Due to free-rider incentives, however, treaties with a large number of signa-
tories cannot be expected to be stable, so that a large part of the bene￿ts
of cooperation cannot be achieved. Barrett (2006) extended this framework
1In 2005 the 20 countries with the largest carbon emissions from energy use stood for
88% of total emissions (counting the EU as one country).
14to collective ￿nancing of R&D and adoption of breakthrough technologies
but e⁄ectively reaches the same conclusion, unless these technologies exhibit
increasing returns to scale. In this paper we connect the level of R&D to the
cost of adoption and argue ￿rst that non-cooperative behaviour may lead to
full adoption with a su¢ ciently high level of the public good R&D. This does
not mean, however, that international treaties are not needed anymore. A
treaty can do better because it can either invest more in R&D in order to
reduce the cost of adoption or it can prevent overinvestment in R&D. We
reach the important conclusion that in this setting the stability properties of
international environmental agreements are much better than in the setting
where treaties only focus on emission reduction.
Our result implies that it can indeed be bene￿cial for international envi-
ronmental agreements to consider breakthrough technologies and R&D when-
ever this is appropriate, not only for the reason Barrett (2006) puts forward
but also for reasons put forward in this paper. For example, the Kyoto
Protocol could consider setting up an R&D joint venture in order to develop
carbon-free energy technologies instead of leaving this to the individual coun-
tries. Either a cheaper technology, adopted by all countries, will be developed
or a more expensive one, adopted by the signatories only. In both cases global
welfare will increase. The ￿rst best will not be achieved but the size of the
coalition will be large and substantial bene￿ts of cooperation will be realized.
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